The 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum: What Line It Draws and What the Objections Are

Why It Matters

The 27 November 2019 memorandum is a bilateral agreement between Türkiye and Libya's then Government of National Accord (GNA) that draws one maritime boundary line between the two coasts. Whether it is legal depends on who is asked: Ankara says an agreement between states with opposite coasts is valid and that islands cannot cut off a mainland's coastal projection, while Athens, Nicosia, Cairo and the European Council say it ignores Greek islands and cannot produce effects for third states. No court has ruled on it, so the dispute is about competing readings of the law of the sea, not a settled judgment.

Background

The memorandum is formally the Memorandum of Understanding on the Delimitation of Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean. It was signed in Istanbul on 27 November 2019 by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and GNA head Fayez al-Sarraj, together with a separate security and military cooperation memorandum. The two texts are often conflated, but only the first concerns the sea.

What the line does

• It sets a boundary for the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the two states through a short series of listed coordinate points.
• The line runs between Türkiye's south-west coast and Libya's north-east coast, in waters south-east of Crete and south of Kasos, Karpathos, Rhodes and Kastellorizo.
• The coordinates logic is an equidistance-style line between the two mainland coasts, with Greek islands in the area given no effect on the line. That treatment is the heart of the dispute.

The agreement is a short political-legal text and does not claim territorial waters around any Greek island. Ankara stresses that the memorandum is confined to the area where Türkiye's and Libya's coastal projections meet.

Timeline

For the wider legal map, see Maritime Contours: How Sea Boundaries Are Drawn in the Eastern Mediterranean and Why Equity Matters. Sister publications offer parallel explainers, including Archive of Nations on the memorandum's text and legal basis and Regions & Powers on what it says and why it matters.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

Athens argues that under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Articles 121, 74 and 83, islands generate the same maritime zones as other land territory. It holds that Crete, Kasos, Karpathos, Rhodes and Kastellorizo lie between Türkiye and Libya, so the two states have no common maritime boundary to delimit. Greece notified its objection to the UN, expelled the Libyan ambassador in December 2019, and says any delimitation with Libya must be negotiated with Greece or taken to the ICJ. Greece and Libya have had technical contacts on this question.

Cyprus

The Republic of Cyprus, administered by the Greek Cypriot side, objected through letters to the UN that the memorandum violates UNCLOS and the rights of third states. It has its own EEZ agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010) and treats the memorandum as part of a wider Turkish challenge to them.

Egypt

Egypt rejected the memorandum as having no legal effect on third parties. In August 2020 Cairo and Athens signed a partial EEZ delimitation agreement that overlaps with the area covered by the Türkiye–Libya line. Türkiye's reply is that Egypt's 2003 agreement with the Greek Cypriot administration and the 2020 Greece–Egypt text themselves cut across Türkiye's continental shelf.

The European Union

In its December 2019 conclusions the European Council stated, in substance, that the memorandum infringes the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the law of the sea and cannot produce legal consequences for third states. Türkiye responds that the EU is not a competent forum for maritime delimitation and cannot adjudicate disputes in the name of 'Union solidarity'.

Libya

Libya's own position is divided. The GNA and its successors in Tripoli have treated the memorandum as valid; the House of Representatives in the east has at times contested its validity and its ratification, and the issue is entangled with Libya's wider political split. Any change in Libyan institutions' stance would affect the memorandum's standing.

Is the memorandum legal?

The memorandum is valid between its parties if Libya's internal approval is sound, but its opposability to third states is genuinely disputed. Both sides cite the same principle: a treaty neither obliges nor entitles a third state (reflected in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Critics say the line necessarily encroaches on zones Greece and Cyprus claim. Ankara says it encroaches on nothing a third state is legally entitled to, because islands should not cut off the mainland coasts. Only a court, tribunal or negotiated settlement can resolve that, and none has yet.

Two further points matter. Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and relies on customary international law, while Libya, Greece, Cyprus and Egypt are UNCLOS parties. And Libya's domestic approval is itself contested. Readers should treat flat statements that the memorandum is 'illegal' or 'fully valid' with caution.

What does it change at sea?

The memorandum changes the legal record and bargaining positions, not the physical map. It does not alter anyone's territorial sea, and no Greek island has lost any water. What it does is establish a competing claim in a zone that Greek, Egyptian and Cypriot agreements also claim. This matters for:

• Hydrocarbon licensing: overlapping claims complicate blocks south of Crete and in the south-eastern Aegean.
• Cable and pipeline routing: projects crossing the zone, such as the Greece–Cyprus electricity interconnector, have been affected by disputed survey rights. Greece protested reported Turkish naval shadowing of survey activity near Kasos in July 2024.
• Future negotiation: any Greece–Libya or Greece–Türkiye delimitation now starts from two contradictory lines.

For how the islands issue plays out near the Turkish coast, see Can an Island Cut Off a Mainland's Continental Shelf? The Kastellorizo Question and the Equity Principle.

Source Comparison

International media often describe the memorandum as an 'illegal' or 'provocative' deal. Turkish sources describe it as an ordinary delimitation between opposite coasts and note that Greece, Cyprus and Egypt concluded their own agreements without Türkiye. A fair reading is that the memorandum is neither settled law nor mere provocation: it is one side of an unresolved delimitation dispute. For further comparisons see Borders & Blocs on the Seville Map and the Libya memorandum and Region Scope on legal basis, objections and impact. Our sourcing standards are set out in Editorial Principles: Primary-Source Standards at Political Contours.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coast, over which a coastal state has sovereign rights for resources.
• EEZ (exclusive economic zone): a zone up to 200 nautical miles (about 370 km) from baselines where the coastal state controls resources.
• Equity principle: the rule that delimitation should achieve an equitable result, considering coastal lengths, geography and proportionality.
• Opposability: whether an agreement can be invoked against a third state.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine of its maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.
• GNA: Libya's UN-recognised Government of National Accord, in office in 2019.

Related guides: Maritime Contours, the Kastellorizo question, Crossroads Review on Blue Homeland, and About Political Contours.

Perspective Note

Political Contours presents Türkiye's official perspective alongside its legal and historical reasoning as a distinct editorial viewpoint on contested issues. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.