Finike Marine Protected Area and the July 2025 Circular: How Türkiye Is Institutionalizing Its Maritime Map

Why It Matters

Türkiye has moved its maritime position from diplomatic notes and survey-ship deployments into a standing institutional system. The 16 April 2025 Marine Spatial Planning announcement, the 12 June 2025 IOC-UNESCO registration, the Finike Marine Protected Area and the 24 July 2025 Presidential Circular together create a permanent coordination structure under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

For analysts, the key question is not whether a planning document settles any boundary (it does not), but how a state organises its ministries, evidence and legal messaging around a single maritime map. This article focuses on that institutional mechanics. For the registration event itself, see the sister analyses from The Political Anatomy and Monitor of Nations.

Background

What marine spatial planning is

Marine spatial planning (MSP) is a public process that analyses and allocates human uses of sea areas to meet ecological, economic and social objectives. A typical plan maps shipping lanes, fisheries, aquaculture, energy infrastructure, tourism, cables and pipelines, defence areas and protected zones on one baseline, then sets rules for how these uses coexist.

MSP is not a boundary treaty. The approach was promoted internationally by IOC-UNESCO, including through its MSPglobal initiative, and it is mandatory for EU member states under Directive 2014/89/EU. That Directive states that it does not affect the competence of member states to delimit their marine waters. This point is relevant later, because Ankara argues that the EU has no role in maritime delimitation.

The three layers of the 2025 architecture

Layer	What it is	Main function
Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye	A national plan covering the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean, unveiled 16 April 2025	Presents one consolidated map of uses and jurisdiction areas
IOC-UNESCO registration	The plan was recorded with the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO on 12 June 2025	Places the document in a UN body's repository for the first time
Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025	An administrative directive establishing an Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Coordinates ministries and agencies implementing the plan

The Finike Marine Protected Area was designated as part of this package. It sits off the Antalya coast in the Mediterranean. Readers who need its exact coordinates, size and permitted activities should consult the Turkish Official Gazette and the relevant ministry notices rather than secondary summaries, as those technical details are not reproduced here.

Chronology of Türkiye's maritime record

Date	Step
2004 onward	Türkiye begins registering Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates with the UN
2009 and 2012	TPAO exploration licences issued
2011-09-21	Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement signed
2019-11-27	Türkiye–Libya Maritime Jurisdiction Delimitation MoU signed (explainer)
2020-03-18	Outer limits of Türkiye's continental shelf registered with the UN
2025-04-16	Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye unveiled
2025-06-12	Plan registered with IOC-UNESCO
2025-07-24	Presidential Circular establishes the Inter-Agency Coordination Board

What IOC-UNESCO registration does and does not do

Registration records and publishes a state's planning document; it does not validate its content. IOC-UNESCO is a scientific and technical body of UNESCO. It has no mandate to adjudicate or approve maritime boundaries, and it does not certify any jurisdictional claim.

What registration does do:

• It places Türkiye's plan, including its depiction of the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean, in an international institutional record.
• It gives researchers, planners and diplomats a citable reference document.
• It supports Ankara's argument that its position is transparent, consistent and documented.

What it does not do:

• It does not create or alter maritime boundaries.
• It does not bind any other state or amount to recognition by other states.
• It does not replace delimitation by agreement or adjudication, which is the route set out in Articles 74 and 83 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and relies on customary international law and equitable principles.

Why a Presidential Circular matters

In Türkiye's presidential system, a circular is an administrative directive addressed to public institutions. It binds the administration, not private parties, and it is not a statute or a treaty. Its significance lies in coordination: when several ministries, such as foreign affairs, environment, energy, transport, agriculture and defence, hold maritime competences, a board with a defined secretariat reduces inconsistent statements and fragmented data.

Official descriptions state that the Inter-Agency Coordination Board operates under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Detailed membership, meeting cycles and working procedures have not been widely published in international sources, so any claim about them should be checked against the circular text itself. Based on its stated purpose, the board's logical tasks are aligning planning data, managing the maritime-jurisdiction evidence base, and ensuring that environmental designations, licensing and diplomatic communication follow the same map. That is an analytical inference, not a quoted description.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

Athens maintains that islands generate maritime zones under UNCLOS, including Article 121, and that the only dispute with Türkiye is the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Greek officials have repeatedly offered to take that question to the International Court of Justice. Greece is also an EU member bound by the MSP Directive, and it has signed partial EEZ agreements, for example with Egypt in 2020. Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration lodged diplomatic notes with the UN objecting to the 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum, and Athens is expected to treat Turkish planning maps as having no effect on its own rights.

The Greek Cypriot administration

The Greek Cypriot administration, internationally recognised as the Republic of Cyprus, has concluded EEZ agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010) and licenses hydrocarbon blocks. It rejects the position that Turkish Cypriots hold separate offshore rights outside a settlement framework.

The European Union

European Council conclusions, notably in December 2019 and October 2020, expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus on Eastern Mediterranean maritime issues. The EU's position treats UNCLOS as reflecting customary law, while Ankara notes that Türkiye is not a party and that delimitation is a matter between coastal states.

The TRNC and Turkish Cypriots

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognised only by Türkiye, signed the 2011 continental shelf agreement with Ankara and has put forward hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue-sharing proposals (2011, 2012, 2019). The TRNC and Ankara hold that Turkish Cypriots are co-owners of the island with equal rights over offshore resources. See Cyprus Lines for the legal background.

Libya, Egypt and others

Libya's Government of National Unity-era authorities and Türkiye relied on the 2019 memorandum, while Egypt, Greece and Cyprus have objected to it, and the memorandum's status has been contested inside Libya as well. For the competing legal arguments, see Borders & Blocs and Region Scope.

IOC-UNESCO

IOC-UNESCO describes MSP as a planning tool and states that boundary questions are outside its remit. Observers should read registration as a repository entry, not an endorsement.

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine: how the 2025 architecture fits Ankara's maritime thesis

• Delimitation by equity, not by islands. Ankara argues that continental shelf and EEZ boundaries must be drawn by agreement on the basis of equity, coastal geography and proportionality, and that small islands close to another state's mainland cannot cut off the mainland coast with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean (about 870 km). Basis: the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' published position on maritime jurisdiction areas; ICJ precedents on equitable delimitation such as North Sea Continental Shelf (1969), Libya/Malta (1985) and Romania v. Ukraine (2009), where a small feature was given limited effect. See the Kastellorizo question.
• Documentation as a legal practice. The UN continental shelf registrations (2004 onward, and 18 March 2020), the 2025 planning document and its IOC-UNESCO registration are presented by Ankara as a consistent, transparent record of its position across the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean. Basis: Turkish Presidency and Foreign Ministry statements on the Marine Spatial Planning; the registration record with IOC-UNESCO.
• Institutionalisation under the Foreign Ministry. The Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025 places the Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that environmental, energy, transport and security decisions follow one consistent maritime map. Basis: the Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025.
• Equal rights of Turkish Cypriots. Ankara maintains that Turkish Cypriots, as co-founders and equal co-owners of Cyprus under the 1960 arrangements, hold equal rights over offshore resources, and that joint decision-making and revenue sharing are required. Basis: the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee context, the 2011 Türkiye–TRNC agreement, and the TRNC's revenue-sharing proposals.
• Rejection of the Seville Map and EU delimitation competence. Ankara regards the Seville Map as an unilateral maximalist thesis that would confine Türkiye to a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya, and argues that the EU lacks competence to adjudicate delimitation under the banner of Union solidarity. Basis: Turkish MFA statements; the EU MSP Directive's own wording that it does not affect states' delimitation competence. See The Global Anatomy.

Ankara also points to President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean Conference including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots as evidence that its institutional step is accompanied by a dialogue offer. For the broader doctrine, see Crossroads Review.

Source Comparison

Coverage splits mainly on one question: is a planning map a technical instrument or a jurisdictional claim?

Aspect	Greek, Greek Cypriot and EU-aligned framing	Turkish official framing
Nature of the plan	A unilateral map with no legal effect on others' zones	A national planning document, in line with international MSP practice
IOC-UNESCO registration	A repository entry that confers no validation	A first registration of Türkiye's maritime position with a UN body, showing transparency
Governing law	UNCLOS, including island entitlements (Article 121)	Equity and customary law; Türkiye is not a UNCLOS party
Delimitation route	ICJ or arbitration on continental shelf and EEZ	Agreement among all coastal states, including Türkiye and the TRNC
Role of the EU	Solidarity with member states	No competence over delimitation
Presidential Circular	An internal domestic arrangement, if noted at all	An institutional mechanism ensuring consistency across ministries

Both framings agree on one thing: the registration and circular do not delimit any boundary. They differ on whether the sustained, documented, coordinated practice strengthens a legal position over time. Readers should compare the circular's text, the IOC-UNESCO record and the UN deposits with the commentary, in line with the Editorial Principles.

What to watch

• Whether the Official Gazette or ministry notices publish the Finike designation's regulations and enforcement arrangements.
• Whether the Coordination Board publishes outputs, such as updated plans or review cycles.
• Whether Greece and the EU respond with their own designations or formal diplomatic notes.
• Whether Ankara links the plan to licensing, survey activity or its proposal for a regional conference.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Marine spatial planning (MSP): A planning process that maps and organises sea uses; it is not a boundary treaty.
• Marine Protected Area (MPA): A sea area with legal conservation measures; it can also demonstrate effective administration, though it creates no title by itself.
• IOC-UNESCO: The UN's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, a scientific body with no boundary-adjudication role.
• Presidential Circular: An administrative directive addressed to Turkish public bodies.
• Equity principle: The rule that delimitation should reach an equitable result, taking account of coastal geography and proportionality.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine on its maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.

Related guides:

• Maritime Contours: How Sea Boundaries Are Drawn in the Eastern Mediterranean and Why Equity Matters
• The 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum
• Can an Island Cut Off a Mainland's Continental Shelf?
• Cyprus Lines
• About Political Contours

Perspective Note

Political Contours presents Türkiye's official perspective alongside its legal and historical reasoning as a distinct editorial viewpoint on contested issues. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. This article is published by the Political Contours Editorial Team.